4 days ago
Pakistan Accused of Tolerating Terror Networks as Afghan Influence Fades
Pakistan and Afghanistan used to have a closer relationship, but it has become much more hostile.
Pakistan had hoped the Taliban would follow its wishes after returning to power in 2021.
The Taliban instead acted more independently.
The Taliban and analysts accuse parts of Pakistan’s security establishment of tolerating some Islamic State Khorasan Province networks.
The Taliban consider ISKP a dangerous enemy and have fought it since 2021.
Pakistan denies or has not responded to these allegations in the material provided.
Afghanistan is also building a road through the Wakhan Corridor toward China.
If the road is completed, Afghanistan may depend less on Pakistan for trade.
Analysts cited by American Thinker say ISKP networks remain active in Pakistan’s Khyber Pakhtunkhwa and Balochistan provinces.
The Taliban have accused Pakistan of allowing ISKP infrastructure, leaders and alleged camps to operate from its territory.
Pakistan’s strategy of seeking influence in Afghanistan through a friendly government has reportedly weakened since the Taliban returned to power in 2021.
Relations between Islamabad and Kabul have deteriorated amid border clashes, airstrikes, economic pressure and mutual terrorism accusations.
Afghanistan’s developing Wakhan Corridor road to China could reduce its reliance on Pakistani trade routes and weaken Pakistan’s regional leverage.
- Who
- Pakistan, the Taliban-led authorities in Afghanistan, and ISKP are the main parties; analysts and the American Thinker report make the allegations.
- What
- The report says Pakistan may be tolerating or supporting some terrorist networks, particularly ISKP, as its conventional influence over Afghanistan declines.
- Where
- The alleged networks are described in Pakistan’s Khyber Pakhtunkhwa and Balochistan provinces, while the wider dispute involves Afghanistan’s border with Pakistan and the Wakhan Corridor.
- When
- The deterioration is described since the Taliban returned to power in August 2021; the article also cites reported developments in February and May 2026.
- Why
- The report argues that Pakistan may seek to weaken the Taliban, preserve leverage over Afghanistan and delay direct Afghan connectivity with China.
Taliban and Analyst Allegations
Pakistan’s Reported Strategic Interests
ISKP’s presence in Pakistan
Taliban and Analyst Allegations
The Taliban and cited analysts allege that ISKP infrastructure, personnel and camps remain active in Pakistan, potentially with tolerance or support from elements of the security establishment.
Pakistan’s Reported Strategic Interests
The material does not provide a Pakistani denial or an official explanation for the allegations; it presents the issue as part of Pakistan’s reported effort to respond to declining influence over Afghanistan.
Pakistan’s policy toward the Taliban
Taliban and Analyst Allegations
The report says Pakistan expected the Taliban to accept the Durand Line, suppress the Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan and remain dependent on Pakistani trade routes and patronage.
Pakistan’s Reported Strategic Interests
According to the report, Pakistan has shifted toward a more confrontational posture after the Taliban asserted independence, with Defence Minister Khawaja Muhammad Asif saying in February 2026 that an open war had begun.
Wakhan Corridor connectivity
Taliban and Analyst Allegations
Afghan authorities are developing a route toward China that could provide Afghanistan with an alternative to Pakistani territory and reduce Islamabad’s leverage.
Pakistan’s Reported Strategic Interests
The report suggests instability around Badakhshan and the Wakhan Corridor could give China reasons to delay direct connectivity, thereby preserving Pakistan’s importance as China’s western partner.
Key facts
- Main group discussed
- Islamic State Khorasan Province (ISKP)
- Alleged locations
- Khyber Pakhtunkhwa and Balochistan, Pakistan
- Taliban’s position
- The Taliban accuse Pakistan of allowing ISKP infrastructure and alleged camps to operate from its territory.
- Pakistan-Afghanistan relations
- The report describes border clashes, airstrikes, economic pressure and mutual accusations of supporting terrorism.
- Strategic objective
- Pakistan’s previous policy sought a friendly, dependent government in Kabul and strategic depth against India.
- Wakhan road progress
- Afghan authorities reportedly said about 70 percent of the route toward China was complete in May 2026.
- Potential consequence
- Direct Afghan-China connectivity could reduce Afghanistan’s reliance on Pakistani territory and trade routes.
Quotes
American Thinker report
Report cited by the article discussing Pakistan’s strategy toward Afghanistan
“Pakistan’s long-standing strategy of treating Afghanistan as an extension of its own security system has collapsed. For decades, Pakistani military and intelligence leaders pursued 'strategic depth'. They believed a friendly government in Kabul would give Pakistan extra space against India and prevent a hostile western border. That assumption no longer holds”
thehansindia.com
“The Wakhan Corridor has become a central arena in this contest. The narrow strip of land gives Afghanistan its only direct border with China’s Xinjiang region. Kabul is building a road toward China. In May 2026, Afghan authorities reported that roughly 70 percent of the route was complete”
thehansindia.com








